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STATE OF NEW.YORK #2A-6/24/76 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAMSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, : 
BOARD DECISION 
Respondent, : AND ORDER 
- and - : 
Case No. U-1255 
WILLIAMSVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, : 
Charging Party, : 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Williamsville 
Teachers Association (charging party) from a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation, who was the hearing officer, 
dismissing its charge. That charge, as amended, had alleged that the 
Williamsville Central School District (respondent) had refused to negotiate 
in good faith in violation of CSL §209-a,l(d) when its superintendent refused 
to grant eight sabbatical leaves. 
The charge herein had been dismissed at the hearing officer level 
once before on May 28, 1975 (8 PERB 4553), The dispute had been submitted to 
grievance arbitration, and the hearing officer ruled that this submission of 
the dispute to arbitration constituted a waiver of the charging party's statu-
tory rights to further negotiations, We reversed the hearing officer on 
September 26, 1975 (8 PERB 3110) and remanded the matter to him. In doing so, 
we determined that submission of the matter to arbitration did not constitute 
a waiver of procedures under CSL §209-a. We did indicate, however-, that 
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"...the arbitration of the matter based on the second 
grievance may have been dispositive of the issue that 
is the basis of the improper practice charge. Thus, 
we are hereby remanding the matter for the hearing 
officer to determine whether the award in the second 
arbitration proceeding satisfies the criteria set 
forth in our New York City Transit Authority decision 
(4 PERB 3669, 3670) and, if not, whether there is any 
merit to the charge." 
At the subsequent hearing, it was stipulated by both parties that they 
fully litigated before the arbitrator the issue raised by the instant improper 
practice charge and that the arbitral proceeding was not tainted by unfairness 
or serious procedural irregularities, Thus, the only issue remaining under 
the criteria provided in the New York City Transit Authority case was whether 
the determination of the arbitrator was clearly repugnant to the purposes and 
policies of the Taylor Law. The hearing officer in the case determined that 
it was not and we agree. 
At issue is whether respondent was obligated by its agreement to award 
eight sabbatical leaves to applicants who were selected by a joint sabbatical 
committee composed of four teachers and three administrators. It is undisputed 
that such an agreement was reached, but according to respondent, that agreement 
never became legally binding, CSL §204-a which was incorporated into the 
contract between charging party and respondent as §1,31 provides; 
"Any provision of this agreement requiring legislative action 
to permit its implementation by amendment of law or by pro-
viding the additional funds therefor, shall not become effec-
tive until the appropriate legislative body has given approval." 
Respondent alleges that its legislative body, the school board, did not provide 
the funds for the eight sabbatical leaves. The charging party makes two 
alternative arguments in answer to this. First, it argues that on September 
30, 1973, which was one day before the agreement was reached, respondent's 
school board agreed to provide the monies necessary to fund the economic 
portions of the agreement by a vote of 5 to 4, Alternativelyf it argues that 
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there were sufficient monies available in the school district budget to 
finance the sabbatical leave provision without the requirement, of any 
additional allocations. 
It is clear that the board of education eventually adopted the resolu-
tion approving and funding all portions of the contract except for the eight 
sabbatical leaves. The charging party argues that the board's refusal to do 
this was not related to the cost of the sabbatical leaves, as indicated by the 
fact that the October 1 agreement called for fewer sabbatical leaves than had 
been granted under the prior agreement. Rather, according to charging party, 
this refusal was dictated by the board's objections to the new procedure 
for ascertaining recipients of sabbatical leaves, a procedure which eliminated 
board of education action. The charging party argues that inasmuch as there 
was no real issue whether to allocate funds, the board could not veto the 
sabbatical leave procedure. 
The hearing officer relied upon the decision of the arbitrator dismiss! 
the grievance. Although the parties stipulated that they had fully litigated 
the issues before him, the arbitrator did not discuss all the issues in his 
opinion. Dealing with the question of whether the provision of sabbatical 
leaves required board approval of the allocation of funds? the arbitrator 
wrote: "...it would appear that probably $100,000 would be needed to provide 
such leaves and allow for substitute services." The arbitrator further 
concluded: ".,,the Board never approved of the sabbatical leave clause"(em-
phasis supplied in original). The arbitrator also dealt with the argument 
that the school board refused to approve the sabbatical leave clause not 
because of financial considerations, but rather because it wished to preserve 
its "'veto' power over sabbatical leave applications" saying: 
AIM 
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"It may very well be that this was the Board's purpose. 
Nonetheless, an arbitrator cannot search into the 
legislative intent of the Board in its.use of a legally 
conferred power. Once the Board has exercised its right 
under law and contract to refuse its approval of Section 
5.24, that section cannot remain effective* Whether or 
not the exercise of its power was arbitrary, capricious 
or lacking in good faith is not a matter that can be 
determined in these proceedings." 
Although the arbitrator did not discuss the argument that on September 30, 
1973 the board had given its approval to the sabbatical leave provision, the 
fact that the matter was fully litigated before him and he rejected the 
validity of that provision is dispositive of it. 
The hearing officer determined that the arbitrator's decision was not 
repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. Moreover, going beyond 
the arbitrator's award, he found that the financial package approved by the 
school board on September 30, 1973 did not include the sabbatical leave 
provision as neither side then perceived it as being an economic item. 
The arbitrator's determination that additional money would have been 
required to finance the sabbatical leave clause and that the provision of such 
additional money was subject to school board approval under §1.31 of the 
agreement — and hence under GSL §204>-a — requires no further consideration, 
The arbitrator, however, specifically declined to rule on whether GSL §204r-a 
authorizes a local legislative body to refuse to provide additional funds for 
the implementation of a clause in an agreement where it objects not to the 
cost of the benefit but to the procedures by which that benefit would be 
provided. We find nothing in the statute that would render such legislative 
action illegal by reason of such motivation. 
Accordingly, the decision below JLs._affirmed: and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be and hereby is dismissed in its 
entirety 
DATED: New York, New York ^_ 
T „. ,„-,> Robert D, Helsby, Chairman 
June 24, 1976 ^ j J ,y~) / a 
Joseph/R. Crowley 
(Did not participate in this decision) ag^g--
Ida, Klaus QOt* 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW YORK, DEPARTMENT OF INVESTIGATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SOCIAL SERVICE:EMPLOYEES -UNION, LOCAL 371, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD //2B-6/24/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1675 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the charging party, 
Social Service Employees Union, Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIQy and the respondent, 
City of New York, Department of Investigation, from a decision of the hearing 
officer dismissing the charge in its entirety. That charge alleged that 
. • • 1 
respondent violated Sections 209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Civil Service Law 
by refusing to permit one of charging party's representatives to be present 
during the course of an interview conducted by the City's Department of 
Investigation with Sanford Rifkin, an employee of the City's Department of Social 
Service and a member of charging party. The charge further alleges that Mr. 
1 CSL §§209-a.l reads, in pertinent part: 
"1. ....It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or its 
agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public 
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two 
hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of such rights; (b) to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any 
employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of such rights; 
(c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging 
or discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities of, 
any employee organization;" (emphasis supplied) 
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Rifkin believed he was being interviewed as part of an investigation involving 
City real estate transactions that might result in disciplinary actions being 
taken against him. Respondent denied that it had any obligation to permit a 
union representative to accompany Rifkin during the interview. It further 
alleged that Rifkin was not compelled to submit to the interview alone and that 
he_was informed jie__could refrain from doing so. 
On June 5, 1975, Rifkin was instructed to call John Appicella, Esq., 
an investigating attorney with the Department of Investigation. He did so and 
was directed to report to Appicella on June 10 for an interview to be conducted 
in connection with Appicella's investigation of a City real estate action that 
Rifkin had taken part in. Rifkin was aware of newspaper reports concerning the 
investigation and expressed concern to Herbert Goldstein, his grievance repre-
sentative. Goldstein made an arrangement for Clifford S. Bart, Esq., the 
charging party's attorney, to represent Rifkin at the interview and both 
Goldstein and Bart accompanied Rifkin to his meeting with Appicella. Upon 
their arrival, Appicella advised them that Goldstein would not be permitted into 
the interview; Rifkin, accompanied by Bart, entered Appicella's office and 
participated in the interview. Since then, no disciplinary action of any kind 
has been taken against Rifkin by either the Department of Investigation or the 
Department of Social Service. 
There is a dispute regarding the circumstances under which Rifkin 
participated in the interview accompanied by the charging party's attorney, but 
not by its grievance representative. The charging party argues that Rifkin was 
coerced into so participating by an awareness that he could have been discipline 1 
for refusing to do so. Respondent argues that Rifkin was not coerced; rather, 
it was explained to him that he could refuse to participate in the interview, 
but that the matter would not be dropped by the Department of Investigation at 
4332 
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that time. On the basis of the evidence presented to him, the hearing officer 
concluded: 
"Although required by his employer to appear for the meeting 
with Appicella, Rifkin's subsequent participation in the 
investigatory interview was entirely voluntary and consistent 
with a desire on his part to 'clear himself of any possible 
suspicion, rather than out of fear or concern that he might be 
disciplined for his failure to participate. This conclusion 
is buttressed not only by the demeanor of the witnesses at the 
hearing but ~by the fact' that ~he~made~ the~dec~is^ 
in the presence of both his union representative and its legal 
counsel—and presumably with their advice." 
Accordingly, he determined that the charge should be dismissed. 
In its exceptions, the charging party argues that the hearing officer 
erred in finding Rifkin's participation in the interview voluntary. In support 
of that and other related exceptions, the charging party submitted an effective 
brief. The brief also articulates the proposition that, as a matter of law, 
Rifkin was entitled to be accompanied by charging party's grievance represen-
tative at the interview. For this proposition it relies primarily upon the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was a permissible construction 
of the National Labor Relations Act when the NLRB ruled that an individual 
employee is entitled to union assistance during an investigation which he 
believes might lead to disciplinary action. In his decision, the hearing officer 
had indicated his opinion "that the general rule of Weingarten is applicable 
[under the Taylor Law]...." Respondent, which endorses the hearing officer's 
findings of fact, takes exception to this opinion. It argues, in what is also 
an effective brief, that the Weingarten doctrine is not applicable to the Taylor 
Law. It also argues that the City's Department of Investigation could be guilty 
of no improper practice with respect to Rifkin because it is not his employer 
and, therefore, has no Taylor Law obligations to him. 
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This latter argument is not persuasive. The Taylor Law obligation of 
refraining from improper practices is imposed upon the public employer and its 
agents. In this instance, the City of New York is the employer and the 
Department of Investigation is its agent. However, we find that neither the 
City nor its agents committed any improper practice against Rifkin or the 
charging party. The charge alleges violations of CSL Sections 209-a.l(a), (b) 
and (c). These three statutory provisions prohibit three types of improper 
practice when such conduct is intended to interfere with the organizational or 
representational rights of public employees. Thus, an element of the charge is 
anti-union animus. No such animus is apparent in the record. Moreover, the 
admission of charging party's attorney into the interview dispels any possible 
suspicion of such animus. Neither does the exclusion of the charging party's 
grievance representative from the interview, which was part of a preliminary 
investigation, constitute a per se violation of the statute. In Matter of 
Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB 3131 (1975), we held that a demand for union representa-
tion at such an interview was not a mandatory subject of negotiations. Thus, 
we do not find it necessary to reach the question of whether Rifkin voluntarily 
participated in the interview or was coerced into doing so either by Appicella 
or by the circumstances. Were we to reach that question, we would have to 
balance the arguments made by charging party in its brief regarding the circum-
stances under which Rifkin agreed to participate in the hearing against the 
hearing officer's specific findings based, as they were, upon the demeanor and 
credibility of the witnesses. 
We also find it unnecessary to determine whether the Weingarten 
doctrine applied under the Taylor Law, and we disassociate ourselves from the 
expression of opinion by the hearing officer that the Weingarten doctrine is 
applicable. We are aware that the Supreme Court relied upon language in Section 
7 of the National Labor Relations Act that is not present in the Taylor Law in 
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endorsing the NLRB's decision in the Weingarten case. That language provides: 
"[e]mployees shall have the right...to engage in...concerted activities for 
the purpose of...mutual aid or protection." We have not had the occasion to 
deal with this question directly, but in Scarsdale, supra, we considered a 
related question. Before us was the question of the negotiability of a demand 
that no policeman may, 
"[b]e subject to any investigation, interrogation, or interview 
in relation to any type of disciplinary action without first 
being presented with a copy of an accusatory report....Upon 
receipt of the accusatory instrument, the member shall not be 
required, requested, or ordered to make any statement, written 
or oral, without being represented by the PBA." 
We ruled, "To the extent that this demand applies to preliminary investigations, 
it is not a mandatory subject of negotiations." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein should be, and hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 24, 1976 
Robert D. Helsby-f Chairman 
Jq/seph/R. Crowley 
(did not participate in decision) 
Ida Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SELATIONS BOARD 
: #20-6/24/76 
In the Matter of \ 
BUFFALO PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, \ 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
-and- I 
CITY OF BUFFALO, \ CASE NO. U-2093 
Charging Party. : 
This case is related to Case No. U-1941 involving the same parties and 
decided by us on March 7, 1976 (9 PERB 3039). In that case, as in this, the 
City of Buffalo (City) charged the Buffalo Patrolmen's Benevolent Association 
(PBA) with refusal to negotiate in good faith in violation of Civil Service Law 
Section 209-a.2(b) by insisting upon the negotiation of demands that are not 
mandatory subjects of negotiations. In the earlier decision, we deferred con-
sideration of the allegation that two demands not referred to in the original 
charge were non-mandatory because, with respect to such two demands, the charge 
raised issues that were beyond scope of negotiations. One of those demands re-
lated to polygraph testing during investigations of departmental misconduct; 
PBA had alleged that they had not improperly insisted that polygraph testing be 
prohibited in the agreement because the City had waived any right to object to 
prohibition of such testing. 
The instant case was filed on April 20, 1976. It relates only to the 
negotiability of a demand of the PBA that "Police officers shall not be required 
to submit to polygraph tests during investigations of Departmental misconduct." 
This clause had been included in a contract expiring on June 30, 1975 by 
reason of the award of an arbitration panel. The charge alleges that the City 
has consistently resisted the inclusion of this item in any successor agreement 
and that the PBA insisted upon submitting this demand to the factfinder over 
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the City's objections. 
On April 27, 1976, the hearing officer forwarded the charge to the PBA 
and indicated that "the City seeks expedited determination as to whether police 
officers shall not be required to submit to polygraph tests...." In that 
letter, the hearing officer directed the PBA to submit an answer to the charge 
and requested the parties to submit legal memoranda by May 7, 1976. On June 
3, 1976, the PBA responded that :"The proper procedure to gain PERB's ruling 
in respect to an item's non-negotiability is not through the filing of an 
improper practice charge. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that Case 
No. U-1941 (sic) be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted." The matter has now been transmitted to us by the hearing 
officer. 
We reject PBA's contention that we may not resolve the question of 
whether a demand is a mandatory subject of negotiations in the context of an 
improper practice case and we reach the merits of the charge. In doing so, we 
accept the allegations of fact contained in the unanswered charge and determine 
that the demand in question is not a mandatory subject of negotiations. In 
Matter of Scarsdale PBA, 8 PEKB 3131, we dealt with a related question involving 
department investigations. We ruled that, to the extent that a demand that an 
employee be entitled to union representation when being questioned applies to 
preliminary investigations, it is not a mandatory subject of negotiations. More 
to the point, in the earlier Buffalo PBA case, we determined that a demand 
prohibiting breathalizer and blood tests is also not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. In that decision, we noted that in the private sector a demand 
by an employee organization that employees not be required to submit to polygrapi 
testing is a mandatory subject of negotiations (see Medi-Center Mid-South 
Hospital, 221 NLRB No. 105 [1975], 90 LRBM 1576). However, we rejected the 
reasoning of the NLRB because the case before us involved policemen, stating: 
^*J*i 4 
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"Law enforcement personnel may be held to a higher standard of compliance with 
law than other persons." 
Following our reasoning in the earlier Buffalo case, we determine that 
the demand herein is not a mandatory subject of negotiations, and 
WE ORDER the Buffalo Patrolmen's. Benevolent Association to negotiate in 
good faith with the City of Buffalo. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 24, 1976 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
(did not participate in decision) 
Ida Klaus 
1 PBA's duty to negotiate in good faith over non-mandatory subjects of nego-
tiations contemplates its withdrawing such demand from factfinding and/or 
arbitration. 
fcsj&tM 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the 
STATE 
UNITED 
LOCAL 
Matter 
OF NEW 
of 
YORK, 
UNIVERSITY 
2190, 
STATE UNIVERSITY 
-and-
PROFESSIONS, INC. 
OF NEW YORK, \ 
Respondent, " 
AFL-CIO, : 
Charging Party. : 
# 2D-6/24/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NOr U-1862 
On October 20, 1975, United University Professions, Inc., AFL-
CIO, Local 2190 (charging party) filed an improper practice charge against 
the State of New York, State University of New York (respondent) alleging a 
1 
violation of CSL Section 209-a.l(a), (b) and (c). The specifics of the charge 
were that seven employees of the Empire State College of the State University 
had suffered injurious personnel decisions by reason of their support for the 
charging party. These improprieties were alleged to have occurred to different 
individuals on different dates, the earliest occurring on June 20, 1975 and the 
J. Civil Service Law §209-a.l reads, in pertinent part: 
"1 It shall be an improper practice for a public employer or its 
agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public 
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two 
hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of such rights; (b) to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any 
employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of such 
rights; (c) to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of 
encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the 
activities of, any employee organization;" 
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2 
latest on September 1, 1975. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
wrote to the charging party on October 24, 1975 advising it that he found 
deficiencies in the charge and inviting it to communicate with the hearing 
officer assigned to the case. Following such communication, an addendum to the 
charge was filed on December 19, 1975; it, too, was rejected on December 23, 
1975 because of deficiencies. The charge was again amended to meet the 
deficiencies. That amendment also specified that three additional employees 
had been discriminated against by respondent. Further material in support of 
the charge arrived at the Board on February 24, 1976 and on the following day 
notice of charge was sent to the respondent for the first time. 
Respondent moved to dismiss the charge to the extent that it relates to 
the original seven individuals on the theory that the charge had not been 
legally sufficient until February 13, 1976 and that, by that date, it was no 
longer timely under Section 204.1 of our Rules, which restricts the filing of 
the charge within four months of the action complained about. The hearing 
officer granted the motion to dismiss. This ruling is the basis of the instant 
appeal. 
2 In part, the charge alleges: 
"II.(A). Upon information and belief, the following individuals are 
all members of the bargaining agent acting in various capacities of 
the agent's Empire State College Chapter; 
Upon information and belief, all of the below individuals are being 
discriminated against because of their union activities and beliefs: 
...[there follows a listing of the seven individuals and for each 
the alleged injurious personnel decision and the date of such decicion].... 
III. The aforementioned actions serve to interfere with, restrain and 
coerce, public employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in 
Sec. 202 of the Act, dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of the employee organization and discriminate against 
employees for the purpose of discouraging membership in and participa-
tion in the activities of the employee organization in derogation of 
Sections 209-a.l (a), 1(b), 1(c) of the Act." 
^sJHMf 
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The charging party and respondent have presented written briefs and oral 
argument to us on this matter. The arguments of the charging party are (1) 
that the charge was legally sufficient when filed on October 20, 1975 and (2) 
even if not legally sufficient on October 20, 1975, it should not be dismissed 
because respondent has suffered no actual prejudice as a result of not being 
notified of the charge until February 25, 1976. For its part, respondent 
endorses the determination of the hearing officer that the charge was legally 
insufficient until February 13, 1976. It also argues that the four-month 
period of the filing of the charge as set forth in Section 204.1 of the Rules 
is jurisdictional and cannot be waived. It expresses this argument in terms of 
prejudice by saying that it would suffer "prejudice as a matter of law" if it 
were required to defend against charges that were not timely filed. In support 
of this argument, it relies upon the decision of the State Supreme Court for the 
proposition that PERB may not waive its own Rules (Cattaraugus County Chapter of 
CSEA v. PERB, 3 PERB 7056 [Sp. Term Rens. Co., 1970]). Having considered the 
arguments of the parties and given attention to the charge as originally filed, 
we deem that the charge when originally filed was legally sufficient, albeit not 
artistically drawn. Thus, the requests of the Director and the hearing officer 
for additional materials were in the nature of requests for particularization 
and did not reflect upon the validity of the charge. 
We regret that the internal procedures established by the Director did not 
3 
call for notification of respondent until the Director and/or the hearing 
officer is satisfied as to the form of a charge. Where, as in the instant 
case, as long as four months have elapsed between the filing of a charge and 
notification of a respondent, it is possible that a respondent will suffer 
actual prejudice. No such prejudice has been demonstrated in the instant case, 
but respondent should be given an opportunity to do so. Should such prejudice 
3^  We have revised this procedure. 
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be demonstrated, we will find ourselves in the distressing situation where our 
internal procedures will have hurt either the charging party or the respondent. 
In that event, we will attempt to resolve the situation in accordance with its 
equities, although respondent makes the point that the Cattaraugus decision may 
deny us the opportunity to do so. In any event, the ruling of the hearing 
officer is reversed and the charge — with reference to the seven employees — 
is'"remanded to him "for hearing on all issues,'"including prejudice, along with 
the charge with reference to the three additional employees. 
There is a second issue in this case. On May 8, 1976, the Chairman of 
this Board was asked to issue a subpoena duces tecum on behalf of the charging 
4 
party for five categories of documents in the possession of respondent. On 
4_ The request was for: 
"a) The confidential personnel files located at Empire State College, 
Saratoga, New York regarding: Randy Reiter, Joel Shufro, Lee Johnson, 
James Paul, Marilyn Huber, Harold Roeth, William Frankonis, Peter Pollak, 
Steven Wilson and Judith Krom. 
b) All correspondence to the central administration of Empire State 
College at Saratoga with regard to the following individuals from the 
deans and other administrative personnel of the respective learning 
centers: Randy Reiter, Joel Shufro, Lee Johnson, James Paul, Marilyn 
Huber, Harold Roeth, William Frankonis, Peter Pollak, Steven Wilson and 
Judith Krom. 
c) Copies of all initial appointment letters to all full-time mentors 
hired by Empire State College since 1971 or, in the alternative, the 
list of all full-time mentors hired by Empire State College since 1971 
with the rank hired at, the degree attained when hired, and the subject 
taught upon hiring. 
d) The record of the Full-Time Equivalencies taught by each full-time 
mentor at the Northeast Learning Center, Albany, New York, for the 
academic year 1974-75. 
e) Copies of all initial appointment letters to all part-time mentors who 
were hired to teach at least a half-time schedule since 1971, or, in the 
alternative, the list of all such mentors and the type of appointment each 
received, i.e., permanent or temporary. 
f) Copies of all letters sent to all full-time mentors hired by Empire 
State College since 1971 offering contract renewals, or, in the alternative 
records of each full-time mentor hired since 1971 indicating the length of 
each contract renewal since their hire." 
Board - U-1862 
-5 
May 12, 1976, he issued a subpoena duces tecum for the first two categories of 
the matters sought by the charging party. Respondent has made a motion that 
the subpoena duces tecum be withdrawn. The basis for the motion was that (1) 
respondent was not given one day's notice pursuant to CPLR Section 2307 (a); 
(2) the subpoena fails to describe with sufficient specificity the records 
required; (3) the charging party failed to indicate that the records sought are 
relevant to the instant proceeding; and (4) no subpoena should be issued until 
we have ruled on the timeliness of the charge with respect to the original seven 
employees. In its brief in support of its motion, respondent also argues that 
the subpoena should be withdrawn because it mandates the production of confiden-
tial material. 
On May 26, 1976, the charging party submitted an affidavit in support of 
issuance of the subpoena. That affidavit establishes the relevancy of the 
materials sought to our satisfaction. Although we find that the subpoena duces 
tecum is sufficiently specific, the charging party's affidavit of May 26, 1976 
provides clarification of what is required of respondent. It is the subpoena 
duces tecum as clarified that we grant herein. Having decided that the charge 
with respect to the seven individuals is timely, respondent's specification 
that the subpoena be stayed is academic. The materials sought by the charging 
party are not privileged communications and such status of confidentiality as 
they may enjoy is not sufficient to prevent their production in connection with 
the hearing. Finally, the reconsideration by us of the request for the subpoena 
duces tecum upon the written briefs and oral arguments of both parties cures 
any objection to the original issuance of the subpoena without one day's notice 
to respondent, if such notice is required. Accordingly, we reaffirm the issu-
ance of the subpoena duces tecum. 
Board - U-1862 -6 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the matter with respect to the seven 
individuals as specified in the original charge 
be remanded for hearing along with the matter 
with respect to the three additional individuals, 
and that the issuance of the subpoena duces 
tecum by the Chairman on May 12, 1976 be 
confirmed and that the respondent honor the 
subpoena duces tecum as clarified. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 24, 1976 
•7 
JosepM R. Crowley 
(Did not participate in decision) 
Ida Klaus 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS JARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
ONONDAGA COUNTY SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL 
AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
-and-
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 5 4 5 , A F L - C I O , 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
#2E-6/24/76 
CASE NO. C - 1 3 5 7 
-~-
:
 -•- •----eERT^FJreA-T-I-OH--GF--R-EFRES-EHTaTI-VE---A-ND--OROER--:-TO:--N-SGOTXATE- - -
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations -Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that International Union,of 
Operating Engineers, Local 545,AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described 'below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: inciU(je(i.: & n part and full time dozer operators, 
crane operators, truck drivers., mechanics/ 
mechanic helpers, welders, heavy equipment 
operators, weigh masters, laborers, main-
tenance men, shredder operators,maintenance-
electric trainees,, welder trainees, maintenance 
' trainees, forman, messenger-driver and stock 
clerk employed at the Employer's Rock Cut 
Road- location, Van Buren, Clay, Brighton and 
Towpath landfill locations, and the Employer's 
Seventh North Street location. 
Excluded: All office clericals, guards, supervisors and . 
seasonal employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 545, AFL-CIO.
 s 
and enter into a .written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
legotiate collectively with such employee organization.in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the. 24thday of June_____^ , 19 76 . 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, CHAIRMAN 
(Did not participate) 
IDA KLAUS 434 'J"~2Xi 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
COUNTY OF ERIE (EDWARD J.. MEYER 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL), 
#2F-6/24/J76 
Case NoC-1240 
Employer, 
-and-
BUFFALO HOUSE STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ERIE COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
" CERTIFICATION'~OF~ REPRESENTATIVE "ANff 'ORDER TO""NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding.having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment- Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the . 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that ;;. 
BUFFALO HOUSE STAFF ASSOCIATION 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All interns and residents employed by 
the County. 
Excluded: All other employees of the County. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall.negotiate collectively with Buffalo House Staff Association 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 24th day of J u n e 19 76 
ROBERT D. HELSBY CHAIRMAN 
PERB 58 (21-68) 
JOSEBH R. CROWLEY \/ 
(Did not p a r t i c i p a t e ) 
IDA KLAUS 
434c mz 
J E R O M E LEFKOWITZ 
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN .. 
S T A T E OF NEW Y O R K 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
5 0 W O L F R O A D 
A L B A N Y , N.Y. 1 2 2 0 5 
June 24, 1976 #4-6/24/76 
Mr. William D. Cabin 
Executive Assistant 
Board of Public Disclosure 
Department of State Building 
162 Washington Avenue 
Albany, New York 12231 
Dear Mr. Cabin: 
On April 28, 1976 I wrote to you describing the practice of the 
part-time members of PESB in accepting clients and labor arbitration 
assignments under circumstances that would oc'casion no conflict of 
interest with their.official responsibilities on behalf of PERB. You 
indicated to me that this practice was consistent with Executive Order 
#10. 
The Board has now decided to formalize these practices and has 
incorporated them into a Resolution adopted at its meeting of June 
24, 1976. A copy of the Minutes of that meeting, including the Board 
Resolution (Item 4.) .is transmitted herewith to you. 
Very truly yours, 
J L / l c 
Encs. 
erome Leffcoftitz 
Deputy Cha^xman } 
4.. 
